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1 Introduction and related work
1.1 Overview of the paper
The main purpose of this paper is to describe a program that solves elementary
mathematical problems, mostly but not exclusively in metric space theory, and
presents the solutions in a form that is hard to distinguish from solutions that
human mathematicians might write. The following two proofs are examples of the
program’s output.1 The first is a proof that if f : X → Y is a continuous function
and U is an open subset of Y , then f−1(U) is an open subset of X, and the second
is a proof that if f : X → Y is an injection and A and B are subsets of X, then
f(A) ∩ f(B) ⊂ f(A ∩B).
Let x be an element of f−1(U). Then f(x) ∈ U . Therefore, since U is open,
there exists η > 0 such that u ∈ U whenever d(f(x), u) < η. We would like
to find δ > 0 s.t. y ∈ f−1(U) whenever d(x, y) < δ. But y ∈ f−1(U) if and
only if f(y) ∈ U . We know that f(y) ∈ U whenever d(f(x), f(y)) < η. Since
f is continuous, there exists θ > 0 such that d(f(x), f(y)) < η whenever
d(x, y) < θ. Therefore, setting δ = θ, we are done.
Let x be an element of f(A) ∩ f(B). Then x ∈ f(A) and x ∈ f(B). That
is, there exists y ∈ A such that f(y) = x and there exists z ∈ B such that
f(z) = x. Since f is an injection, f(y) = x and f(z) = x, we have that y = z.
We would like to find u ∈ A ∩B s.t. f(u) = x. But u ∈ A ∩B if and only if
u ∈ A and u ∈ B. Therefore, setting u = y, we are done.
The ‘human-style’ output demonstrated by these two examples is the most visible
novel feature of the program, since the problems it solves are all well within the
capacity of existing programs. However, this novelty reflects a less obvious novelty
in the way that the program operates. It would not be able to produce human-style
output if it did not mirror very closely the way that human mathematicians think.
Address(es) of author(s) should be given
1 The program produces LaTeX output, which we reproduce verbatim here.
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We envisage that the program will be just the first in a sequence of programs, and
we hope that as a result of our detailed attention to human thought processes,
future programs in the sequence will be able to solve problems that have not
previously been solved by fully automatic provers.
The structure of this paper is as follows. We begin with a brief discussion of
why there has not been more interaction between mathematicians and researchers
in automatic theorem proving. Over the following three subsections, we talk about
human-oriented theorem proving and explain why we see this tradition as appro-
priate for what we are trying to do. We then discuss previous work on natural-
language output for theorem-proving programs.
In the second section of the paper, we explain how our program works. We start
by informally presenting an example of the program in action. This is followed by
a description of the ‘moves’ that the program makes. We then present a second
example, this time discussing more explicitly why the program does what it does.
We end the section by explaining how the program writes up its thoughts to
produce the kind of output shown above.
In the third section, we describe an experiment that we conducted in order
to test whether the output of the program was hard to distinguish from genuine
human mathematical writing. We conclude with a brief discussion of our future
plans.
1.2 Mathematicians’ attitudes to automated provers
We come to this project as mathematicians who are fascinated by the question
of how people manage to think of proofs of difficult theorems. Since this question
would seem to be fundamental to the whole enterprise of mathematical research,
one might think that large numbers of mathematicians would have studied it.
However, although mathematicians certainly have thought about their thought
processes – the most famous example being Polya [37,35,36] – far less attention
is paid to the topic than one might expect, and papers are routinely written in
a style that appears to do its best to conceal how the ideas they contain were
discovered.
The result is that the work of analysing and understanding in detail how math-
ematicians arrive at proofs has to date been mainly carried out by the automatic
theorem proving community. Unfortunately, this work has been largely ignored by
mathematicians: regrets about this have been expressed in many places in the lit-
erature. In a recent article, Bundy discussed this indifference and suggested several
reasons for it [17]. From his reasons one general theme emerges: the mathemati-
cal style of current automated provers is very different from the style of human
mathematics. This is not just a question of the language such provers use to ex-
press problems and their solutions, but also the nature of the solutions themselves,
which are often very long and use low-level arguments where a human mathemati-
cian would use high-level arguments. Bundy suggests that things are changing (in
response to the last point he suggests using ‘hiproofs’, a hierarchical presenta-
tion of proofs that allows the reader to look at them at several different levels of
granularity) and that it is inevitable that automated provers will in due course
become an indispensable tool for mathematicians. We agree with this, and one of
our motivations is to do what we can to hasten this development.
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What could induce mathematicians to be interested in automated provers?
In some cases, the answer is easy: there are mathematics problems that require
large searches or enormously complicated calculations, and computers are better
at these tasks than humans. But most mathematics is not like that, and for the
part that is not, there is a difficulty. Current automated provers are still a long way
from being able to answer questions (except of the specific kind just mentioned)
that might arise in a typical research project, so the task for the moment is to
teach computers to solve much easier questions of a kind that mathematicians
can easily do by hand. This task, though it has considerable intrinsic interest,
has no immediate payoff for mathematical researchers, so if one wants input from
mathematicians who are not specialists in automated theorem proving, then the
barrier to entry will have to be very low.
For this reason it would be highly desirable to have an automated prover with
the following properties.
1. (User-friendly input.) One can input problems without needing to learn a special-
purpose formal language.
2. (User-friendly output.) The program will output solutions expressed in the lan-
guage that mathematicians customarily use.
3. (Informative solutions.) The solutions are not just certificates of truth: they are
arguments of the kind that a good human mathematician might produce.
4. (Easy extendability.) One can increase the power of the program by adding data
in the form of facts, problem-solving tips, etc., rather than having to rewrite
the entire program.
In short, it would be wonderful to have an automated theorem prover with which
one could interact in much the way one interacts with a human mathematician.
This is an ambitious goal that will be difficult to achieve, but if it can be
achieved, then it is likely that far more mathematicians will become interested in
automatic theorem proving.
1.3 Human-oriented theorem proving: some background
Since the early days of automated theorem proving, there have been two com-
peting broad approaches. The first, human-oriented, tradition focuses on analysing
human methods and replicating them in programs. The second, machine-oriented,
tradition instead relies on the brute strength of computers, using extensive search
to solve problems in ways that a human would find difficult to replicate. Given
our long-term goal of helping to create a program that mathematicians will want
to use, it is natural that our own work should belong firmly in the human-oriented
tradition. However, this tradition is distinctly out of favour at present; for ex-
ample, if you look at the range of solutions to the standard TPTP test library
automated theorem provers [40,41], you could be forgiven for not realizing that
the human-oriented tradition had ever existed.
Since the human-oriented tradition is less well known these days, we shall
briefly describe it here. Our account is not intended to be comprehensive: we focus
on the strands that most closely relate to our own work. More detailed accounts of
the various periods in theorem proving may be found in [8], [44], [29], pp. 464–469
of [24], the introduction to [11], [16], and [19].
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The earliest human-oriented prover was Newell and Simon’s 1956 Logic The-
ory Machine [32], which proved theorems from Russell and Whitehead’s Principia
Mathematica [43], and is often considered to be the first artificial intelligence pro-
gram. Its methods were directly modelled on those of humans: Newell and Simon
studied their own behaviour when proving theorems, and abstracted out heuris-
tics which they then implemented in their program. Their goals were wider than
those of contemporary theorem proving: they hoped not just to prove theorems
but also to ‘[apply] research on complex information-processing systems ... [to] hu-
man learning and problem solving’. Indeed, they used the successor to the Logic
Theory Machine, their General Problem Solver [31], as the foundation of a book
entitled Human Problem Solving [33].
In the subsequent decade, much of the work on automated theorem proving,
including the General Problem Solver and Gelernter’s Geometry Theorem Proving
Machine, continued in the heuristic, human-oriented tradition, sometimes drawing
directly on mathematicians’ analyses of their own methods in works such as [37,
35,36]. This trend was arrested by Robinson’s highly influential paper A Machine-
Oriented Logic Based on the Resolution Principle. Robinson’s resolution was a single,
simple inference rule which turned out to be dramatically more effective than pre-
viously existing methods. Unlike the earlier methods, resolution had no natural
human correlate: formulae needed to be converted into a not very readable ‘nor-
mal form’ before resolution could be applied, and actual resolution proofs were
often difficult or impossible for humans to follow. However, the hugely increased
efficiency of resolution meant that these were minor concerns.
The next few years saw an explosion of research into resolution. Numerous
improvements were rapidly found, and it seemed at the time that a suitably ad-
vanced version of resolution might solve the problem of automated theorem prov-
ing well enough for all practical purposes. As a result, human-oriented work was
more or less abandoned: while a handful of researchers, including Newell and Si-
mon, remained focused on human cognition, the majority were concerned with
problem-solving effectiveness and so devoted their attention to resolution.
According to [29], the optimism of those times was somewhat dimmed by
the discovery of NP-completeness [18,26], and the associated realization that it
was unlikely that there was a complete, polynomial time algorithm for theorem
proving. Nevertheless, the majority of researchers continued to focus on machine-
oriented methods throughout the 70s. The notable exception to this was a group
run by Woody Bledsoe at the University of Texas in Austin. Bledsoe’s first steps
in the direction of human-oriented theorem proving may be found in [1], which
uses top-level heuristic techniques to split a problem into smaller subproblems
which are then solved by resolution. This paper was soon followed by a 1972 paper
on limit theorems [7], written by Bledsoe and his students Boyer and Henneman.
They took an existing system [1] and replaced resolution with a new procedure,
which he described as ‘[bearing] a closer resemblance to the proof techniques of a
mathematician than does resolution.’ Among other results, this procedure was able
to prove that differentiability implies continuity and that the limit of a product of
functions is the product of the individual limits. In the light of the fourth desirable
property mentioned above, one feature of the procedure that is worth highlighting
is that it ‘[did] not release its action unless its need is detected’; that is, it did not
interfere with those proofs in which was not potentially useful. This is in sharp
contrast to resolution, where adding irrelevant axioms can significantly degrade
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performance. The paper notes that such heuristics ‘should be sought for other
areas of mathematics’.
Five years later, Bledsoe wrote a seminal paper on mathematical human-
oriented proving, Non-resolution theorem proving [2]. In it, he described himself
as one of a number of researchers who had ‘made the switch’ after finding that
resolution and related techniques had encountered enormous difficulty in solving
problems that a human would find easy, and that substituting human techniques
resulted in a program which ‘easily succeeded’. Bledsoe expressed the opinion that
“purely syntactic” methods such as resolution had reached a plateau, and that
further progress would not be made without using more human techniques. He
described the key to progress as somehow managing to use ‘the knowledge accu-
mulated by humans over the last few thousand years, to help direct the search for
proofs’. The paper went on to outline the main concepts used in human-oriented
proving at the time. A number of these are very relevant to the work we describe
below, including the use of rewrite rules, forward chaining, typing, a reluctance
to expand definitions unless necessary, and the use of ‘natural’ or ‘goal-oriented’
systems.
Bledsoe continued to work on human-oriented proving for the remainder of
his life; notable achievements include the proof of a number of results using non-
standard analysis [6], a proof of the intermediate value theorem [3], the use of ex-
amples to guide proofs [4], and analogical proof construction [5]. Reading through
these papers, one has no sense that human-oriented proving had reached a plateau:
Bledsoe’s approach to automating the discovery of proofs of mathematical theo-
rems continued to be fertile throughout his life. Unfortunately, the ‘AI winter’
meant that funding for mathematical theorem proving dropped sharply soon after
Bledsoe ‘made the switch’. As a result, many of Bledsoe’s students were forced
to move to areas with more direct commercial relevance than mathematics, with
the result that the Bledsoe tradition in mathematical ATP effectively petered out.
Bledsoe’s students did, however, carry his human-oriented tradition into other
areas of theorem proving. Of particular note are Robert Boyer and J. Strother
Moore, who created a family of provers that are used to this day, primarily for
software and hardware verification.
Although many features of the Boyer-Moore provers, NQTHM and ACL2, were
driven by the needs of software verification as opposed to mathematics, two fea-
tures of these provers are significant in a mathematical context. First, Boyer and
Moore emphasise the importance of creating a single program that could be used
to tackle a range of problems, whereas Bledsoe constructed a sequence of loosely
related provers, each intended to tackle different problems. Second, based on in-
tensive inspection of their own proof techniques, Boyer and Moore introduced an
overall architecture, the ‘waterfall’ architecture, which was much more systematic
than the architectures introduced by Bledsoe. The Boyer-Moore waterfall consisted
of four heuristics, ordered in terms of their relative attractiveness to humans. A
Boyer-Moore prover repeatedly applies the least risky heuristic that can be used,
terminating when the result is proved or when no heuristic can be applied.
The Boyer-Moore provers partially inspired work in the next chapter of human-
oriented theorem proving, the work done by the group run by Alan Bundy at the
University of Edinburgh. Bundy had been influenced by real, human mathematics
from the beginning of his career [10,13], and reports a Bledsoe-like experience of
disillusionment with machine oriented methods [12], but his major achievements in
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human-oriented proving began with a later attempt to reconstruct the behaviour
of the Boyer-Moore prover within a more systematic framework [14]. This led
him to formulate the notion of a proof plan, a computational representation of a
high-level heuristic used by human mathematicians. Because one application of a
proof plan corresponded to many smaller reasoning steps, a theorem prover that
used proof plans could operate with a dramatically reduced search space. This
often led to a proof discovery process that was very similar to that of a human
mathematician. There is an extensive literature on proof plans, which we will not
discuss here, since proof plans are not explicitly used in the work described below.
A description and evaluation of this work may be found in [15].
Meanwhile, on the machine side there was a notable triumph: a result with a
strong claim to be the first solution by an automated theorem prover of an unsolved
problem in mainstream mathematics. The problem was the Robbins conjecture,
that an algebra that obeyed a certain axiom must be a Boolean algebra, which
had been open for six decades when William McCune proved it in 1996 using an
automated theorem prover called EQP (for ‘equational prover’) and eight days of
computer time [30].
This might appear to indicate that the two aims of producing more powerful
provers and of producing provers that will be easy to use by humanmathematicians
are in conflict. We do not believe that this is the case, for reasons that we shall
now explain.
1.4 Doing more with less
As we have already said, if one wants to write a program with which mathemati-
cians can interact easily, it is natural to be drawn to the human-oriented tradi-
tion. However, as the history of that tradition makes clear, that is by no means the
only motivation. There is also a conviction amongst proponents of human-oriented
methods that in order to build provers that can solve certain kinds of problems –
roughly speaking, the problems that human mathematicians typically deal with,
apart from the ones that need a lot of search or heavy calculation – it is necessary
to come to grips with human problem-solving techniques. For example, Bundy
says the following in his influential Science of Reasoning.
Although our science of reasoning might find application in the building
of high performance automatic theorem provers, the two activities are not
co-extensive. They differ both in their motivation and their methodology.
I take the conventional motivation of automatic theorem proving to be the
building of theorem provers which are empirically successful, without any
necessity to understand why. The methodology is implied by this moti-
vation. The theorem prover is applied to a random selection of theorems.
Unsuccessful search spaces are studied in a shallow way and crude heuris-
tics are added which will prune losing branches and prefer winning ones.
This process is repeated until the law of diminishing returns makes further
repetitions not worth pursuing. The result is fast progress in the short term,
but eventual deadlock as different proofs pull the heuristics in different di-
rections. This description is something of a caricature. No ATP researchers
embody it in its pure form, but aspects of it can be found in the motivation
and methodology of all of us, to a greater or lesser extent.
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Automatic theorem provers based on proof plans make slower initial progress.
Initial proof plans have poor generality, and so few theorems can be proved.
The motivation of understanding proofs militates against crude, general
heuristics with low prescriptiveness and no expectancy. The ‘accidental’
proof of a theorem is interpreted as a fault caused by low prescriptive-
ness, rather then a lucky break. However, there is no eventual deadlock to
block the indefinite improvement of the theorem prover’s performance. If
two or more proof plans fit a theorem then either they represent legitimate
alternatives both of which deserve attempting or they point to a lack of
prescriptiveness in the preconditions which further proof analysis should
correct.
[...]
Thus, we expect a science of reasoning will help us build better automatic
theorem proving programs in the long term, although probably not in the
short term.
Although Bundy’s ‘science of reasoning’ was (at least initially) tightly focused
on the notion of a proof plan, we believe that many of his comments apply more
generally to the advantages of human oriented proving over machine oriented prov-
ing, and especially his conclusion: that in the long term, paying close attention to
human methods will pay dividends.
There are two main reasons for this. A simple one is that a significant problem
with automated theorem provers – some would call it the main problem – is the
danger of combinatorial explosion. It is in the nature of solving a complex math-
ematics problem that one throws up other problems that need solving, which in
turn throw up further problems, and so on. If a generous amount of search is per-
mitted, then this recursive nature of problem solving naturally leads to the search
being iterated, and thus to a combinatorial explosion. Somehow, in ways that we
do not fully understand, humans manage to avoid this difficulty by keeping search
strictly under control. Therefore, it seems highly plausible that it will not be pos-
sible to design provers that can produce complicated hierarchical proofs without
a deep understanding of how humans manage to do so.
The second reason is more subtle, and best illustrated by means of an example.
Consider the following problem.
Problem 1 Let G be a group and let S be a subset of G with the property that
if x ∈ S and y ∈ S, then xy−1 ∈ S. Prove that S is closed under taking inverses.
This was used as a test problem for a system devised by Reiter in the 1970s [39].
His system was designed to use models to prune search trees: if a statement is
false in a simple model, then there is no need to waste time investigating whether
it can be proved. It is clear that this reflects an extremely important aspect of
human problem solving: before we invest time in proving a statement, we like to
feel that that statement has at least some plausibility. Therefore, it is natural to
want to incorporate some kind of checking-against-models facility into a theorem
proving program.
Here, translated for human consumption, is what Reiter’s system does. It be-
gins by taking an element b ∈ S (if S is empty then the problem is trivial) and sets
itself the goal of proving that b−1 ∈ S. The one property it has available for use is
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that S is closed under the operation (x, y) 7→ xy−1, so it uses backwards reasoning
to replace the goal by that of finding x, y ∈ S such that xy−1 = b−1.
At this point, it searches for suitable candidates for x and y. It has three
statements that these two variables need to satisfy: x ∈ S, y ∈ S and xy−1 = b−1.
It searches for a solution in a somewhat mechanical way, ordering the conditions
that need to be satisfied and then attempting to satisfy them one by one. It begins
with the order in which the conditions are presented, so it tries to satisfy the first
condition. Since all it knows so far is that b ∈ S, it takes x = b. The first statement
is now satisfied, so it passes to the second and takes y = b for similar reasons. It
is now left needing to prove that bb−1 = b−1.
Instead of wasting time looking for a proof of this false (in general) statement,
it checks it against a model such as the Klein four-group, rapidly finding a coun-
terexample. So at this point it backtracks, reorders the statements that need to be
satisfied, and ends up attempting to satisfy what used to be the third statement,
xy−1 = b−1, without, for the time being, worrying about whether x ∈ S and y ∈ S.
It finds the simplest solution to this, namely x = e and y = b. Now it is left needing
to prove that e ∈ S, which is straightforward: it needs u, v ∈ S such that uv−1 = e
and the first thing it tries, namely u = v = b, works.
Thus, Reiter’s system successfully solves the problem, and even does so quite
efficiently. However, there are at least two ways in which what it does is strikingly
unlike what a human mathematician would do. The first is its mechanical approach
to satisfying the conditions on x and y. In general, finding an object that satisfies
two or more properties is a tricky problem, since it is difficult to focus on more than
one condition at a time. Humans will often begin by assessing which is the hardest
condition to satisfy, since in practice it often happens that the most natural object
that satisfies the hardest condition either already satisfies the easier conditions or
can be easily modified to do so. By contrast, Reiter’s program starts by attempting
to satisfy the conditions in the order in which they are written down, which leads
it to make a wrong guess that no human mathematician would be likely to make.
If we are just interested in the performance of one program, this is not much
of a problem, since there are only three conditions, so the amount of backtracking
it has to do is very slight. However, if we are content with this in the short term,
then we miss out on search-reducing techniques that may be useful in the longer
term.
The second noticeably non-human move made by the computer is to test the
statement bb−1 = b−1 against a model (in Bledsoe’s account of this work, he sug-
gests using the Klein 4-group). To a typical human mathematician, this statement
is just obviously false in general. Of course, it is not much help to a theorem proving
program to be told that a statement is ‘just obvious’, so let us look more closely at
why it is obvious. The answer is that we see very easily that, by the cancellation
law, if bb−1 = b−1 then b = e. And even at that point we say to ourselves some-
thing like, “Not all groups are trivial,” rather than “The cyclic group of order 2 is
a counterexample.” Thus, if we are content with Reiter’s method, then we miss out
on two further search-reducing strategies: to simplify statements before deciding
whether they are likely to be true, and to make the working assumption that a
sufficiently simple general statement that is not obviously true is almost certainly
false.
That is not all that can be extracted from a close look at how a human would
tackle this problem. Reiter’s system always reasons backwards, but a human might
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well look at the hypothesis that S is closed under the operation (x, y) 7→ xy−1 and
reason that since the only element we know to be in S is b, there is no hope
of solving the problem without making the deduction that bb−1 is an element
of S, and therefore that S contains the identity e. And once one has made that
deduction, finding x and y in S such that xy−1 ∈ S is significantly easier than it was
before. So we have another potentially useful technique: if a statement appears to
be essential and can be applied in only one way, then there is no harm in applying
it, even if you cannot see what good it will do.
These remarks are not intended as a criticism of Reiter’s program, which was
successful at what it was trying to do. But they illustrate the general point that
the closer the attention one pays to how humans solve problems, the more useful
information one can extract. This gives us another reason for trying to make our
programs as human as possible. Indeed, we would describe our work as belonging
not just to the human-oriented tradition, but as belonging to the extreme human
end of the machine-human spectrum. In practice, this means deliberately not al-
lowing ourselves to exploit the speed of computers, for example by letting them
carry out large searches or perform very complicated calculations.We hope that by
submitting to this restriction, we will force ourselves to develop a number of useful
and important techniques while the problems we are tackling are still relatively
simple.
1.5 Two kinds of proof
The arguments of the previous section are intended to show that there are poten-
tial advantages to taking a strict human-oriented approach to automated theorem
proving. However, there is no denying that there are also advantages to using raw
computer power. And the fact that it is the machine-oriented approach that has
solved a decades-old unsolved research problem suggests that its advantages out-
weigh those of the human-oriented approach. Perhaps the situation with theorem
proving is like the situation with chess, where the brute force of the computer
beats the advanced pattern-recognition skills of the human grandmaster.
Before we jump to that conclusion, however, we should consider another possi-
bility: that machine-oriented methods are better for finding certain kinds of proofs,
and human-oriented methods are better for finding other kinds. The evidence sug-
gests that this is the case. As Kerber puts it [27], when talking about machine-
oriented programs, “The strength of these systems is truly remarkable and even
open mathematical problems, like recently the question whether Robbins algebras
are Boolean algebras, can be solved with the assistance of an automated theo-
rem prover. On the other hand, observing the blind search behaviour of such a
system as it fails to solve a problem that seems trivial to us as humans can be
disappointing.”
This phenomenon is not too surprising. Some proofs seem to consist of a succes-
sion of somewhat arbitrary and unpredictable steps, while others can be discovered
by means of what mathematicians would describe as ‘key ideas’. The proof of the
Robbins conjecture comes into the first category: one can think of it as a combina-
torial object that belongs to a vast space – the space of sequences of well-formed
statements that satisfy certain simple rules – inside which we are looking for a
sequence that ends in a certain way. There are no obvious measures of progress
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that tell us that some initial segments of sequences are ‘obviously right’ or at least
‘getting warmer’ (though it is conceivable that somebody might one day find a
more conceptual argument), and in the absence of such clues there is not much
for it but to undertake a huge search. It is therefore only to be expected that
machine-oriented methods have outperformed human-oriented methods for that
problem and for others of a similar kind.
However, for the majority of proofs that mathematicians find, there is some
kind of ‘story’ to tell of the ideas that give rise to the proof. Typically, such a story
will be a high-level overview of the main difficulty and how it is overcome, where
‘overcome’ means that the problem is reduced to one or more problems where that
difficulty no longer occurs. Often this reduction is achieved by means of a well-
chosen intermediate statement that turns out to follow from the initial assumptions
and imply the conclusion. The intermediate statement itself is typically found not
by means of a brute-force search but by a process of approximation: one might
make a guess, find that it is unhelpful, understand why it is unhelpful, and use
that understanding to guide the search for a better intermediate statement. These
characteristically human techniques enable mathematicians to penetrate deep into
‘proof space’, but the set of proofs that can be discovered in this way forms a tiny
fraction of that space. It seems almost a truism that human methods will be useful
for programs that want to find these special proofs that human mathematicians
are so mysteriously good at finding.
1.6 Systems with natural-language output
So far, we have discussed the desirability of a program that will reason in as similar
a way as possible to the way that humans reason. Another desirable property that
we mentioned earlier is that the input and output of the program should be in the
language that mathematicians already use. Several systems have been developed
that use natural language to a greater or lesser extent.
An early example with some similarity to ours is that of Felty and Miller from
1987 [20]. They start with a proof tree and convert it into a more readable form.
Their system can also make significant changes to how a proof is presented. The
following is an example of output from their system: it is a proof that there are
infinitely many primes. The function f mentioned in the proof can be taken to
be the function defined by the formula f(n) = n! + 1: then the beginning of the
proof is asserting some properties of this function that are subsequently used in
the proof (so any other function with those properties would do just as well).
Assume ∀x(f(x) > x) ∧ ∀x∀y(div(x, f(y)) ⊃ (x > y)) ∧ ∀x(¬prime(x) ⊃
∃y(prime(y)∧div(y, x)). We have two cases. Case 1: Assume ¬prime(f(a)).
By modus ponens, we have ∃y(prime(y)∧ div(y, f(a))). Choose b such that
prime(b) ∧ div(b, f(a)). By modus ponens, we have (b > a). Hence, (b >
a) ∧ prime(b). Thus, ∃x((x > a) ∧ prime(x)). Case 2: Assume prime(f(a)).
Hence, (f(a) > a) ∧ prime(f(a)). Thus, ∃x((x > a) ∧ prime(x)). Thus, in
either case, we have ∃x((x > a)∧ prime(x)). Since a was arbitrary, we have
∀n(∃x((x > n) ∧ prime(x))).
They describe their mechanism for converting the original tree-structured de-
ductions into readable natural-language text as very simple. It is clear that with
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some small changes they could have improved the readability. For example, they
could have replaced prime(x) by ‘x is prime’, div(x, y) by x|y and the symbols
for connectives by English words. However, the result would still have had some
slightly odd characteristics – for instance, no human mathematician would bother
to write ‘by modus ponens’ – that would have betrayed its mechanical origins.
Another program that produced readable text was written by Holland-Minkley,
Barzilay and Constable in 1999 [25]. Their aim was to create natural-language
output from the Nuprl system. This is an interactive system based on tactics – that
is, high-level inference steps – which is designed to mimic human reasoning. The
output from the Nuprl system is not at all easy for the untrained mathematician to
read. However, they could convert it into language that was considerably closer to
what a human mathematician might write, as the following sample demonstrates.
Theorem: For integers a and b and natural number c, (a − −b) − −c =
a−−(b+ c).
Consider that a and b are integers and c is a natural number. Now, the
original expression can be transformed to imax(imax(a − b; 0) − c; 0) =
imax(a − (b + c); 0). From the add com lemma, we conclude imax(−c +
imax(a+−b; 0); 0) = imax(a+−b+−c; 0). From the imax assoc lemma, the
goal becomes imax(imax((a+−b) +−c; 0 +−c); 0) = imax(a+−b+−c; 0).
There are 2 possible cases. The case 0+−c ≤ 0 is trivial. Consider 0 < 0+−c.
Now, the original expression can be transformed to imax((a+−b)+−c; 0+
−c) = imax(a + −b + −c; 0). Equivalently, the original expression can be
rewritten as imax((a+ −b) + −c) = imax(a+ −b+ −c; 0). This proves the
theorem.
In many ways this looks like the kind of continuous prose that a mathematician
would write, though as with Felty and Miller’s system there are a number of telltale
signs of the mechanical origins of the text. For instance, the first sentence is not
quite grammatical: a human would write, ‘Let a and b be integers and let c be
a natural number.’ There is also the trivial point that mathematicians would
write ‘max’ rather than ‘imax’ (trivial because it would be very easy to change
this). There is also a repetitive quality to the prose that gives it an automatically
generated feel: for instance, two sentences open with ‘Now, the original expression
can be transformed to’.
Another system that is often promoted for the readability of its output is
MIZAR. Although this is not an automatic theorem prover, we show an exam-
ple of its output for the sake of comparison. The following is a formalized ver-
sion in MIZAR of Euclid’s proof that there are infinitely many primes. [From
http://www4.in.tum.de/~wenzelm/papers/romantic.pdf .]
reserve n,p for Nat;
theorem Euclid: ex p st p is prime & p > n
proof
set k = n! + 1;
n! > 0 by NEWTON:23;
then n! >= 0 + 1 by NAT1:38;
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then k >= 1 + 1 by REAL1:55;
then consider p such that
A1: p is prime & p divides k by INT2:48;
A2: p <> 0 & p > 1 by A1,INT2:def 5;
take p;
thus p is prime by A1;
assume p <= n;
then p divides n! by A2,NATLAT:16;
then p divides 1 by A1,NAT1:57;
hence contradiction by A2,NAT1:54;
end;
theorem p: p is prime is infinite
from Unbounded(Euclid);
Although this is quite clearly written in a formal language, it is natural enough
that with a bit of effort, one can follow the steps of the argument, at least if
one knows the argument already. And if readability were the only concern, then
once again there would be simple ways of improving the output. For example, one
could remove all the ‘by X’ justifications at the ends of lines. Of course, readabil-
ity is not the only concern when a proof is written in MIZAR. More generally,
there are major differences between our aims and the aims of those who formalize
mathematical proofs. Our aim is to write fully automatic programs with output
that meets the typical standards of soundness of human mathematicians, whereas
the proof-verification community aims to use a great deal of human interaction to
produce completely formalized proofs.
As we have already mentioned, we would ultimately like to contribute to the
creation of a program that mathematicians can use with little or no effort. It
therefore makes sense to set very high standards for the readability of our output.
Another reason for doing this is that we would like to be confident that our pro-
grams really are thinking in a human way. A natural test of this is that it should
be able to produce output that is similar to what a human produces.
However, passing that test is not by itself sufficient evidence, since in principle
one might be able to create a program that discovers human-style proofs with the
help of a highly mechanical and non-human discovery process. Such a program
could then hide its thought processes and produce nice readable write-ups. We
therefore want to add an extra condition: we would like our programs to create
human-style write-ups while being faithful to its thought processes. By this we mean
that the steps that the program takes in order to discover the proofs it discovers
should be directly translated into human language and should be presented in
the order in which they are made. For example, if a program discovers a short
argument after a long search, then the long search should be presented and not
just the short argument.
There is an obvious objection to this, which is that not even human mathe-
maticians do it. For example, often they will take all sorts of wrong turns when
searching for proofs, and these will not be recorded in the write-ups. And often
they will present, as if out of nowhere, an object that just happens to make a proof
work, hiding from view the process by which they thought of it.
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This is an important point, but the proofs we will discuss in this paper are not
sufficiently difficult to find for the issue to arise in a significant way. For the proofs
the program finds, it is possible to produce output that is faithful to the program’s
thought processes and also quite close to what a human would write as the final
product. When we come to tackle more complex problems, we plan to have two
styles of output. One will be a proof as a human might write it, and the other will
be more like an account, again as a human might write it, of the proof discovery
process. We believe that both styles are potentially useful to mathematicians.
It is one thing to claim that a program produces output that is similar to what
a human might write; it is another to provide evidence to back up that claim.
Later in the paper, we shall describe an experiment that we carried out for this
purpose.
1.7 Soundness
A further motivation for producing human-style write-up is that it gives us a
mechanism for checking soundness: if the program produces proofs that a human
mathematician finds acceptable, then it is doing what we ask of human mathe-
maticians.
This attitude to soundness is in sharp contrast with most research in auto-
mated theorem proving, especially of the interactive variety. There what is sought
is a guarantee of soundness, which is obtained by carefully building up a corpus of
statements from a small set of axioms, using only basic rules of logic and state-
ments that have already been established. There are very good reasons for this:
for example, such systems can handle extremely complicated proofs that are very
difficult for humans to check by hand, a notable recent example being Gonthier’s
machine-checked proof of Thompson’s odd-order theorem [21]. They can also check
the soundness of computer hardware, where an absolute guarantee is essential.
However, for a program that produces proofs of relatively easy theorems, con-
siderations of this kind do not apply. Therefore, we take the attitude to soundness
that a typical human mathematician takes: we want it to be clear to a human
mathematician that the steps the program takes are sound, and we want the re-
sults that the program assumes to be ones that are well established and in some
sense ‘prior’ to the results being proved. Although this does not provide a formal
guarantee of soundness, there are no examples of well established mathematical
results of the level of simplicity we are dealing with that have been found to be
fundamentally wrong, so for all practical purposes it is a sufficient assurance of
soundness.
1.8 The other criteria: user-friendly input and easy extendability
The remaining two desirable criteria that a mathematician-friendly program should
have were that it should be possible to input problems without having to learn a
formal language, and that it should be possible to improve the performance of the
program by adding data.
It is much harder to write a program that accepts natural-language input than
it is to write a program that produces natural-language output, since for any given
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problem there will be many ways of writing it, and the program has to be able
to handle all of them – or at least, enough of them to make the program not too
restrictive. For the time being, our input takes a form that is not written in natural
language, but is fairly straightforward to write. (For example, to request that the
program show that the pre-image of an open set U under a continuous function f
is open, we supply hypotheses continuous(f) and open(U) and a target statement
open(preimage(f,U)). A more complicated example is forall x epsilon.(in(x,B)
=> exists y.(in(y,A) & lessthan(d(x,y), epsilon))).) However, Barnet-Lamb
and Ganesalingam have recently written a program that is capable of processing
many different statements. Roughly speaking, any mathematical statement that
is written at the level of formality that is typical of the more formal parts of
mathematical textbooks has a good chance of being understood. So it may be
that future versions of the program will be able to accept natural-language input
as well.
As for the possibility of making the program more powerful by adding more
data to it, we are optimistic about this, but it would be premature to make any
claims in this direction. In general, adding mathematical information to a theorem-
proving program can be problematic, because it gives the program more choice.
If the program makes significant use of search, then more choice can make the
searches bigger, and in practice this has meant that some programs have performed
worse when they have more information to go on. The program has not had this
problem, but its library is so small that we cannot at this stage claim that it
never will. The reason we are optimistic is that our methodology, if we apply it
sufficiently rigorously, should ensure that the problem does not arise. If a program
threatens to get bogged down searching through all sorts of irrelevant results,
then that will be a sign that we have not understood how human mathematicians
select relevant results from the large amount that they know. Understanding that
may be very challenging, but if we cannot fully understand it, then we will try to
reach a partial understanding and make use of that. In other words, we will try
to find sufficient conditions for a use of the program’s data to be human-like, and
allow uses that satisfy those conditions. If the program only ever uses its data in
a human way, then adding data should not degrade its performance, since it does
not degrade the performance of human mathematicians.
2 The program
2.1 Solving routine problems in a fully human way
The ‘extreme human’ approach we are trying to adopt can be summarized as
follows: we do not allow our programs to do anything that a good human mathemati-
cian wouldn’t do. A serious difficulty in trying to design a program that satisfies
this constraint is that while humans do their very best to avoid search and back-
tracking, they undoubtedly do at least some search and backtracking when they
are trying to solve difficult problems. What is the distinction between the kind
of search that humans do and the kind that humans would never do? Indeed, is
there a distinction, or is it just a matter of degree?
These are difficult questions, and rather than try to answer them immediately,
it seems more sensible to try to isolate them by concentrating first on other dif-
A fully automatic problem solver with human-style output 15
ficulties and facing up to this one only when we are forced to do so. Accordingly,
we define a routine problem to be one that a good human mathematician will
typically solve easily without backtracking. If a program is to satisfy the main
constraint, then it too will have to solve routine problems without backtracking,
so we can simply ban it. Although this is a significant scaling down of ambition, it
also makes the project far more realistic in the short term. Furthermore, the class
of routine problems is large and diverse enough that the challenges it raises are
still very interesting.
2.2 Example: closed subsets of complete metric spaces
Before we describe our program, let us look at a routine problem and examine how
a human mathematician would typically solve it. The problem is to show that a
closed subset of a complete metric space is complete. We can state it more formally
as follows.
Problem 2 Let X be a complete metric space and let A be a closed subset of X.
Prove that A is complete.
The proof discovery process would usually be something like this.
1. [Clarify what needs to be proved.] We must show that every Cauchy sequence in
A converges in A.
2. [We must show something about every Cauchy sequence, so pick an arbitrary one.]
Let (an) be a Cauchy sequence in A.
3. [Clarify what now needs to be proved.] We are trying to show that (an) converges
in A.
4. [See what we can say about the sequence (an).] The sequence (an) is a Cauchy
sequence in the space X, and X is complete; therefore (an) converges in X.
5. [Give a name to the object that we have just implicitly been presented with.] Let x
be the limit of the sequence (an).
6. [See what we can say about x.] But A is closed under taking limits, so x ∈ A.
7. [Recognise that the problem is solved.] Thus, (an) converges in A, as we wanted.
Our program is designed to imitate these typical human moves as closely as
possible. The result is that what it does can be straightforwardly translated into an
account of its thought processes that could pass for an account of human thought
processes such as the ones laid out above (without the accompanying commentary).
The architecture in which moves are applied is very similar to that of a LCF-
style interactive theorem prover [22]. In simple cases, the program state consists
of a list of statements that can be assumed, which we call hypotheses, and a list
of statements to be proved, which we call targets. Each statement is basically a
formula of the (many-sorted) first-order predicate calculus, but it can also carry
annotations that record information that has been accumulated by the program;
for example, a statement may be tagged to indicate that it has already being used
during the course of the proof. Although information of this kind is logically un-
necessary, it is indispensable in human reasoning and therefore plays an important
role in our automated theorem prover.
The representation diverges from that of a LCF-style prover in more compli-
cated cases, most notably when a conjunctive target needs to be deduced from the
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hypotheses. In this case a LCF-style prover would use a tactic such as replacing
the original goal by two new goals, each of which lists the hypotheses separately.
By contrast, our system represents and displays the hypotheses only once. This is
not done for reasons of efficiency, but rather to mimic the natural human represen-
tation. A human would think in terms of one ambient primary collection of ‘facts
that are known’ (the hypotheses) and a number of targets that need to be deduced
from these; the program reflects this. In some cases, reasoning will introduce a fact
that may be used in the proof of only one of the targets (and the program repre-
sents this appropriately), but this is very much the marked (i.e. non-default) case
and should not affect the representation of the majority of ‘universally available’
hypotheses.
An individual move is an operation that transforms a specific problem state
into another state in a sound fashion; thus individual moves correspond to appli-
cation of tactics to a specific LCF-style prover state. However, we insist that our
program’s moves faithfully model cognitive processes of human mathematicians.
Thus, many sound transformations of the problem state are not acceptable as
moves, because they correspond to operations that humans would never perform.
The closest correlate we have to a tactic (as opposed to the application of a
tactic to a specific state) is a generator for a move type. An example of a move type
would be ‘forwards reasoning’. Each move type has an associated generator which,
given a state, returns a list of moves from that state. So for example the generator
for the ‘forwards reasoning’ move type accepts a state and returns a list of all the
‘forwards reasoning’ moves that can be made from that state. Note that, unlike
tactics, generators may return a whole list of moves.
Because the prover is fully automated, the list of move types is fixed. Move
types are ranked in order of attractiveness or priority, and the basic operation
of the program consists of repeatedly choosing the most attractive move type
that can be applied, generating the moves of that type, and applying the most
attractive one. In practice with the problems we are considering, it is rare for the
most attractive move type to generate more than one move, except in cases where
the moves generated are related by some simple symmetry.
Note that this architecture closely resembles the Boyer-Moore ‘waterfall’ archi-
tecture [9] discussed in §1.3. The waterfall consisted of four heuristics, ranked in
order of their relative attractiveness to humans. A Boyer-Moore prover repeatedly
applies the most attractive heuristic that can be used, terminating when the result
is proved or when no heuristic can be applied. This directly corresponds to the way
in which our prover repeatedly chooses the most attractive move type possible,
terminating when the result is proved or when no no moves can be made.
We shall now describe what our program does when it tackles the example
problem given above, and then explain in more detail what the move types are,
and what the order of priority is. Like Boyer and Moore, we chose the move types
and their priority by examining our own reactions to many different problems.
The initial problem state for this problem is as follows.
H1. X is a complete space
H2. A is closed in X
T1. A is complete
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The first thing the program does is expand the definition of “A is complete”.
H1. X is a complete space
H2. A is closed in X
T2. ∀(an) (an) is Cauchy ∧ (an) is a sequence in A⇒ (an) converges in A
Next, it does a move that corresponds closely to the human move of picking an
arbitrary Cauchy sequence: it gets rid of the universal quantifier and places the
premises of the resulting conditional statement above the line, leaving the conclu-
sion below the line. A small technical point is that we insist that it combines these
two operations into a single move, because we do not allow “bare” conditionals:
that is, statements of the form P (x) ⇒ Q(x) that are not universally quantified.
(One reason for doing this is that such statements almost always seem very strange
and unnatural to humans. However, we have also found situations where it helps
the program to avoid doing genuinely bad moves.)
H1. X is a complete space
H2. A is closed in X
H3. (an) is Cauchy
H4. (an) is a sequence in A
T3. (an) converges in A
Next comes an operation that fits under the general heading of forwards reasoning:
from the assumptions that (an) is Cauchy and X is complete, it follows that (an)
converges. Of course, this deduction can be broken up: one would expand the
statement “X is complete” to say that every Cauchy sequence in X converges,
then substitute (an) for the universally quantified sequence, and finally use modus
ponens to deduce that (an) converges. However, a human mathematician would
do all this in one step, and therefore so does our program. Of course, to do it
the program must have access to the expansion of “X is complete”, which indeed
it does: it has a library of definitions and basic facts that it can make use of
whenever it wants. This models the collection of definitions and facts that a human
mathematician would store in his or her long-term memory.
After the step, the problem state is this (except that there will be tags on the
statements H1 and H3 to indicate that they have been used – to keep the problem
states easy to read we are not displaying the tags in this discussion).
H1. X is a complete space
H2. A is closed in X
H3. (an) is Cauchy
H4. (an) is a sequence in A
H5. (an) converges
T3. (an) converges in A
At this point, it will be clear to a human that the hypothesis H1 has been ‘used
up’. That is, it has played its role and will almost certainly not be required again.
It is not easy to work out precise necessary and sufficient conditions for when
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humans judge a statement to be used up in this sense, but we have identified
some conditions that appear to be sufficient. The hypothesis H1 satisfies those
conditions and is therefore deleted.
A human mathematician would also be confident that hypothesis H3 has been
used up. Our program does not delete H3 because it does not know that the Cauchy
assumption will not be expanded later. This we regard as an imperfection of the
program that needs at some point to be corrected. (One possible justification for
deleting H3 is that it is implied by H5. Whether this is the ‘right’ reason remains
to be worked out.)
Deleting statements turns out to have no effect on the performance of this
program, so there might seem to be no point in worrying about it. However, we
remain of the view that we should try to model all aspects of human problem
solving. A potential benefit of thinking about the discarding of hypotheses is that
it is a special case of a more general issue that undoubtedly will be important for
performance when the problems get harder: dealing with irrelevant statements.
Often with complicated problems one is presented with more information than
one needs, and it is important to decide which out of all the statements available
are likely to be useful.
H2. A is closed in X
H3. (an) is Cauchy
H4. (an) is a sequence in A
H5. (an) converges
T3. (an) converges in A
The next move applied by the program is to expand hypothesis H5. The reason
the program likes this move is that the expansion of the hypothesis begins with
an existential quantifier, so expanding it gives us a new object to work with. The
program automatically removes the existential quantifier, thereby implicitly pick-
ing a limit for the sequence (an) – again, this surreptitious removal of quantifiers
mirrors the way human mathematicians think and write. After the expansion and
quantifier removal, we arrive at the following problem state.
H2. A is closed in X
H3. (an) is Cauchy
H4. (an) is a sequence in A
H6. (an)→ a
T3. (an) converges in A
Now the program does another kind of forwards reasoning, where a result from the
library is used. The library result states that a closed set contains its limit points.
If we apply this result to the set A, the sequence (an) and the limit a, then the
hypotheses H2, H4 and H5 give us precisely the premises we need, which allows
us to conclude that a ∈ A.
H2. A is closed in X
H3. (an) is Cauchy
H4. (an) is a sequence in A
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H6. (an)→ a
H7. a ∈ A
T3. (an) converges in A
At this point our deletion rules allow the program to delete H2. We also see why
it is important to be cautious about deleting statements: the hypotheses H4 and
H6 have been used, but they are going to be used again. Fortunately, our deletion
rules do not cause either of them to be deleted.
H3. (an) is Cauchy
H4. (an) is a sequence in A
H6. (an)→ a
H7. a ∈ A
T3. (an) converges in A
The final step for the program is to look at the expansion of the target, which is
(an) is a sequence in A ∧ ∃z z ∈ A ∧ (an)→ z
and observe that if it sets z equal to a, then all three resulting statements occur
above the line as hypotheses. Because of this, it declares the problem solved.
2.3 Some terminology
With the possible exception of our rules for deleting statements, which are not
essential to the program, all the move types we use in the program are fairly
standard in the field, or are combinations and minor variations of standard move
types.
Before we say what they are, it will be useful to have some terminology for the
different kinds of statements that can occur. We call a statement atomic if it is of
the form P (x1, . . . , xk), where P is a predicate and x1, . . . , xk are terms. We do not
insist that it is actually written in this form, so for example the statement
d(x, y) < ǫ
is an atomic statement, which we could if we wanted to write in the form
is less than(d(x, y), ǫ).
When a statement is built out of atomic statements using connectives and quanti-
fiers, we classify it according to the operation that appears at the top of its parse
tree. For example, the statement
∃x x ∈ A ∧ d(x, y) < ǫ
is an existential statement, whereas the statement
x ∈ A ∧ d(x, y) < ǫ
is conjunctive. It is often useful to look more than one level down the parse tree.
For example, we would call the statement
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∀x x ∈ A⇒ x ∈ B
a universal conditional statement. (Recall that we do not allow ‘bare’ conditional
statements, so this is a particularly important category.) Similarly, the existential
statement above can be further classified as an existential conjunctive statement.
Finally, many atomic statements can be expanded into statements that are
no longer atomic. For example, the statement A ⊂ B expands to the universal
conditional statement above. It is often useful to know what a statement will
become after it is expanded: to specify this we use the prefix ‘pre-’. Thus, the
statement A ⊂ B is pre-universal conditional. We call an expansion elementary if
it does not introduce a quantifier. For example, the expansion of A ⊂ B is not
elementary, whereas the expansion of
x ∈ A ∩B
as
x ∈ A ∧ x ∈ B
is elementary.
2.4 How the program works
The following lines are taken directly from the program’s code: they list, in order
of priority, the names of the moves that it can do. In the rest of the section, we
shall explain what those moves are.
--Deletion
deleteDone,
deleteDoneDisjunct,
deleteDangling,
deleteUnmatchable,
--Tidying
peelAndSplitUniversalConditionalTarget,
splitDisjunctiveHypothesis,
splitConjunctiveTarget,
splitDisjunctiveTarget,
peelBareUniversalTarget,
removeTarget,
collapseSubboxTarget,
--Applying
forwardsReasoning,
forwardsLibraryReasoning,
expandPreExistentialHypothesis,
elementaryExpansionOfHypothesis,
backwardsReasoning,
backwardsLibraryReasoning,
elementaryExpansionOfTarget,
expandPreUniversalTarget,
solveBullets,
automaticRewrite,
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--Suspension
unlockExistentialUniversalConditionalTarget,
unlockExistentialTarget,
expandPreExistentialTarget,
convertDiamondToBullet,
--EqualitySubstitution
rewriteVariableVariableEquality,
rewriteVariableTermEquality
The program repeatedly applies a move of the first type it can from this list.
Thus, if a move of type deleteDone can be performed, it performs it. If not, but
a move of type deleteDoneDisjunct can be performed, then it performs that. Oth-
erwise, it tries deleteDangling. And so on.
2.4.1 Deletion moves
The moves can be divided into some broad categories. We begin by discussing
moves that delete statements from problem states.
Deletion is intended to model the human capacity to recognise that a state-
ment is no longer going to be used and to turn attention away from it. Exactly
how mathematicians do this involves several subtleties, which we shall discuss else-
where. Here we give a brief indication of how the program works. One key point
is that we do not normally delete statements unless they have been used as part
of a reasoning step. This is because for the problems our program tackles, there
is a strong presumption that every statement that appears will at some point be
used, so it is risky to delete an unused statement, even if it appears to be unusable.
However, once a statement has been used, this risk is greatly diminished, so under
suitable conditions we are much happier to delete it. Therefore, the program tags
hypotheses as ‘vulnerable’ when they have been used, and its deletion rules are
not applied to hypotheses unless they have this tag.
deleteDone
There are several situations where a move results in a target being replaced by
the word ‘done’ because it has been proved. Once this has happened, the program
immediately deletes it. The aim of the program is to reach a problem state with
no targets.
deleteDoneDisjunct
If a target is disjunctive and one of its disjuncts is the word ‘done’, then the entire
target is deleted.
deleteDangling
We call a free variable v dangling if it is involved in just one statement. This is
a strong sign that the statement cannot be used. It is not a conclusive proof: for
example, there might be an existential target that can be solved if we substitute
v. However, if a statement contains a dangling variable and is vulnerable, then the
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program deletes it. This is a pragmatic decision on our part rather than one that
is fully justified theoretically: there may be problems where deleting statements
that have been used and that contain dangling variables is the wrong thing to do,
but that situation does not appear to arise for the kinds of problems the program
is designed to handle.
deleteUnmatchable
Suppose that we have the statements x ∈ A and A ⊂ B as hypotheses. The
expansion of A ⊂ B is ∀u u ∈ A =⇒ u ∈ B. If we substitute x for u, then the
premise of this statement becomes x ∈ A, which is identical to the hypothesis.
We say that x ∈ A matches the premise of (the expansion of) A ⊂ B. We call a
statement unmatchable if there are no available matches for it.
The program is not allowed to substitute the same variable twice into the same
hypothesis. (This is partly because no human would ever do so, and partly to avoid
getting into a loop.) This can create further circumstances where a hypothesis is
unmatchable. For example, suppose we apply forwards reasoning to the statements
x ∈ A and A ⊂ B to deduce that x ∈ B. Then we can no longer use the match
between x ∈ A and A ⊂ B, so x ∈ A becomes unmatchable (assuming that there is
no other statement that matches it). Since it has been used, it is vulnerable, and
will therefore be deleted. If no other statement matches A ⊂ B, then that too will
be deleted.
2.4.2 Tidying moves
Tidying moves are moves that do not substantially change the logic of the problem
state, but put it into a more convenient form.
peelAndSplitUniversalConditionalTarget
If the target takes the form ∀x P (x)⇒ Q(x), then this move creates a new hypoth-
esis P (x) and replaces the target by Q(x). This corresponds to the human move
of saying (or thinking), ‘Let x be such that P (x); we need to show that Q(x).’ We
can regard it as a composition of two moves: one to get rid of the quantifier and
one to split up the conditional statement. We use the word ‘peel’ to refer to any
move that gets rid of a quantifier.
If there is more than one target, then this move has to be modified, since we
cannot use P (x) to help us prove a different target. In that situation, we create
what we call a box. A box looks like a problem state within a problem state: it
has a line with some statements above it and some statements (or subboxes – box
formation can be iterated) below it. If the peel-and-split move creates a box, then
that box lives below the main line.
That is, if we have a problem state of the form
Hypotheses
∀x P (x) =⇒ Q(x)
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R
then after the move we will transform it to
Hypotheses
P (x)
Q(x)
R
The program then knows that it can use P (x) to prove Q(x) but not to prove R.
The hypotheses above the main line can of course be used to prove both statements.
Boxes are regarded as complex targets (in the above case the target corre-
sponding to the box would be to demonstrate that P (x) implies Q(x)) and as such
can form part of a list of targets. For example, if there are two boxes, one written
above the other, that means that the implications within both boxes need to be
established. Sometimes one needs to establish just one such implication: in that
case one writes the two boxes side by side with a ‘∨’ symbol in between them.
In theory, boxes can be nested, though this rarely happens in practice. The
rules governing which statements can be used to prove what are as follows. For each
statement, there is a minimal box that contains it (counting the entire problem
state as a box). Two boxes are comparable if one contains the other in an obvious
sense, and two statements are comparable if the minimal boxes containing them
are comparable. All deductions that the program makes must involve comparable
statements.
A quick way to interpret a box is to regard the line in the middle as an impli-
cation sign, the lists of statements involved as linked by conjunction, and the box
itself as placing brackets round everything.
splitDisjunctiveHypothesis
If there is a hypothesis of the form P ∨ Q, then the program splits the problem
into two, one with P as a hypothesis and one with Q as a hypothesis. Technically,
it achieves this by forming two boxes, one displayed above the other to indicate
that both must be established.
splitConjunctiveTarget
If there is a target of the form P ∧Q, then it is replaced by two targets P and Q.
splitDisjunctiveTarget
If there is a target of the form P ∨Q, then it is replaced by two boxes, linked by
a ∨ symbol. One box has nothing above the line and P below the line, and the
other has nothing above the line and Q below the line.
This move exists for technical reasons: for example, the program sometimes
likes to attach tags to statements, but it has no facility for attaching tags to parts
of statements. Therefore, if we want to use a tag to record information about one
disjunct of a disjunctive target, we need to ‘split’ the target first.
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peelBareUniversalTarget
If the target is of the form ∀x P (x) and P is not a conditional statement, then this
move replaces the target by P (x).
There is a sense in which bare universal targets should never occur, since when
we quantify over x, we do not quantify over every object in the universe, but rather
over some set X. So one might argue that the statement ∀x P (x) should really be
rendered as the universal conditional statement ∀x x ∈ X =⇒ P (x). What we
mean by a ‘bare universal’ statement is one where the ‘premises’ are background
statements that we do not want to elevate to ‘substantive’ status. For example,
we would regard the expansion of the statement ‘G is Abelian’ as a bare universal,
since the only condition needed for two elements to commute is the background
information that they are elements of G.
removeTarget
This is actually a class of move types, but what they have in common is that
under appropriate circumstances they replace a target with the word ‘done’. The
most obvious example is when a target equals a hypothesis (and that hypothesis
is allowed to be used to prove the target). A more complicated example is when
the target is of the form ∃u P (u)∧Q(u) and there are hypotheses P (x) and Q(x).
The other circumstances are similar.
collapseBoxedTarget
If a box B has nothing above its internal line, contains no suspended variables (see
below for a definition) and is not joined to another box with the ∨ symbol, then
the statements below its internal line are listed as targets without the box B.
2.4.3 Applying moves
An applying move is a move where we apply a hypothesis, result or definition.
forwardsReasoning
This covers a number of closely related steps that the program can take. The
most basic example is using hypotheses of the form P (x) and ∀u P (u) ⇒ Q(u)
to obtain the hypothesis Q(x). However, there are several natural variants and
generalizations of this. An obvious one is that if there are hypotheses of the form
P1(x), . . . , Pk(x) and ∀u P1(u)∧ · · · ∧Pk(u) =⇒ Q(u), then the program generates
the hypothesis Q(x). Deductions of this kind are often called forward chaining.
A variant that is worth highlighting is illustrated by the following simple piece
of reasoning: if we know that x ∈ A and that A ⊂ B then we can deduce that
x ∈ B. Humans will make this deduction in one step rather than first expanding
the statement A ⊂ B as ∀u u ∈ A⇒ u ∈ B. Our program does the same. In general,
for each type of reasoning move that involves a universal conditional hypothesis,
there is a variant that does essentially the same thing to a pre-universal conditional
hypothesis.
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forwardsLibraryReasoning
This is reasoning that is ‘mathematical’ rather than ‘purely logical’. We have seen
an example of it already: deducing from the statements ‘(an) is a sequence in A’,
‘A is closed’ and ‘an → a’ that a ∈ A. The reason this deduction can be done in
one step is that the library contains a general result that says that whenever a
sequence in a closed set tends to a limit, then the limit belongs to the closed set
as well.
Logically speaking, forwards library reasoning is similar to ordinary forwards
reasoning, but there are one or two aspects of it that give it a different flavour.
The main one is that library results contain no free variables: they are general
facts that apply universally. This distinguishes them from hypotheses, which are
more contingent. A second difference is that forwards library reasoning is normally
used to deduce an atomic hypothesis from other atomic hypotheses. A universal
conditional statement is involved, but it is in the library and is not a hypothesis.
expandPreExistentialHypothesis
As its name suggests, this means replacing a pre-existential hypothesis by its
expansion. What the name of the move does not reveal is that this expansion is
followed immediately by a peeling to get rid of the existential quantifier. So for
example the statement ‘α has an inverse’ might be replaced by αβ = βα = 1.
This would be modelling a two-step human thought process. The first step is
to note that there exists β such that αβ = βα = 1, and the second step is quietly
to forget about the existential quantifier and to refer to β as though it has been
chosen. Human mathematicians will usually miss out a step that says something
like, ‘Let β0 be such that αβ0 = β0α = 1’, so the program does as well.
elementaryExpansionOfHypothesis
This takes a hypothesis that has an elementary expansion and replaces it by that
expansion. This is sometimes combined with some tidying. For example, if the
hypothesis in question is x ∈ A∩B, then the elementary expansion is x ∈ A∧x ∈ B,
but this expansion is immediately converted into the two hypotheses x ∈ A and
x ∈ B and does not itself appear in any problem state.
backwardsReasoning
Given a target Q(x) and a hypothesis ∀u P (u)⇒ Q(u), this replaces the target by
P (x).
More generally, if we have a target Q(x) and a hypothesis ∀u P1(u) ∧ · · · ∧
Pk(u) =⇒ Q(u), then it is logically sound to replace the target Q(x) by the k
targets P1(x), . . . , Pk(x). Deductions of this kind are often called backward chaining.
The program is allowed to do this more complex backward chaining only under
tightly constrained circumstances: it must be that all but one of the statements
P1(x), . . . , Pk(x) is a hypothesis, so that only one new target is created. This is
another pragmatic decision: it is a crude way of deciding whether applying the
hypothesis ∀u P1(u) ∧ · · · ∧ Pk(u) =⇒ Q(u) is likely to be the right thing to do,
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and the severity of the test is intended to stop the program making ‘speculative’
deductions that risk leading to combinatorial explosion.
As with forwards reasoning, there is a simple variant where the role of the
universal conditional hypothesis is played by a pre-universal conditional hypothesis
instead. For example, given a target x ∈ B and a hypothesis A ⊂ B the program
could use this variant to replace the target by x ∈ A.
backwardsLibraryReasoning
This is backwards reasoning that makes use of a general result in the library.
However, it is slightly subtler than forwards library reasoning, because it always
uses hypotheses as well as a target. The precise rule is that if there are hypotheses
P1(x), . . . , Pk−1(x), a library result ∀u P1(u)∧· · ·∧Pk(u) = Q(u) and a target Q(x),
then the target can be replaced by Pk(x). (The premises of the library result do
not have to be stated in the order P1, . . . , Pk.)
An example of this kind of reasoning would be to say, “It is sufficient to prove
that B is open,” if one wished to prove that A∩B was open and knew that A was
open. This would be making use of the result that an intersection of two open sets
is open.
elementaryExpansionOfTarget
This replaces a target by an elementary expansion of that target, if it has one.
expandPreUniversalTarget
This replaces a pre-universal target by its expansion. This move will be followed
by one of the tidying moves peelAndSplitUniversalConditionalTarget or peelBare-
UniversalTarget. It is usually the first move that the program makes when faced
with a naturally stated problem.
solveBullets
As we are just about to discuss in more detail, we sometimes mark a variable w
with a diamond or a bullet. This indicates that the variable needs at some stage
to be chosen in such a way that the problem can be solved. If the variable only
ever appears in targets, then one simple way in which this can often be done is to
identify another variable x with the property that if we substitute x for w, then
every target that involves w is equal to a hypothesis. In that situation, all those
targets are replaced by ‘done’. This move is what we call ‘solveBullets’.
automaticRewrite
There are a few rewriting rules stored in the library. Two examples are that the
statement x ∈ f−1(A) is rewritten as the statement f(x) ∈ A and the term g ◦f(x)
is rewritten as the term g(f(x)). (Of course, these are general rewriting rules and
work whatever the variables happen to be called.)
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The rewriting of statements takes place only when those statements have been
isolated as hypotheses or targets, so for example the program would not rewrite
the statement y ∈ f−1(U) when it occurs inside the larger statement ∀y d(x, y) <
δ ⇒ y ∈ f−1(U). However, terms can be rewritten as soon as they appear.
2.4.4 Suspending moves
We now come to the class of moves just alluded to: moves that help us deal
with existential targets when it is not immediately clear what to substitute for the
existentially quantified variable. A standard technique for this, which is essentially
the technique we use, is to form metavariables. The rough idea of a metavariable is
that one reasons with it as though it had been chosen, deferring the actual choice
until later when it becomes clearer what choice will make the argument work.
Mathematicians often use this trick: a classic example is the ‘3ǫ-argument’ used
to prove that a uniform limit of continuous functions is continuous.
When the program ‘pretends that it has chosen’ a variable, it marks that
variable with a bullet, and we say that it has been suspended. Thus, suspension
is the process of converting a variable into a metavariable. However, we found it
convenient to introduce two ‘levels of suspension’, to model two styles of reasoning
that are logically similar but psychologically quite different.
unlockExistentialUniversalConditionalTarget
To illustrate this, suppose we have a target such as ∃δ ∀y d(x, y) < δ ⇒ f(y) ∈ B,
and also a hypothesis ∀u u ∈ A =⇒ f(u) ∈ B. Then it is easy to see that we
can reduce the target to ∃δ ∀y d(x, y) < δ =⇒ y ∈ A. However, this move is
not open to the program because it is not allowed to ‘reason inside quantifiers’.
This is a matter of convenience: such moves are logically valid, but it is tedious
to specify appropriate variants of several of the reasoning moves listed above.
Instead, we apply a procedure that we call unlocking, which effectively moves aside
the existential quantifier and allows the program to reason as normal with the
statements inside it.
More precisely, what the program does to ‘unlock’ the statement is create a
box. In the example above, it would have no statements above the line, and below
the line it would have the statement ∀y d(x, y) < δ ⇒ f(y) ∈ B. The diamond on
the variable x indicates that x needs to be chosen.
It is important for the program not to interchange quantifiers accidentally. For
this reason, we tag the box just created with the variable x, to indicate that the
existential quantification over x is within that box.
After unlocking the statement, the program peels and splits the resulting uni-
versal conditional target (so a more accurate name for the move type would be
unlockPeelAndSplitExistentialUniversalConditionalTarget). After that, we have a
box that looks like this.
d(x, y) < δ
f(y) ∈ B
Once we have done this, the statement f(y) ∈ B has become a target and the
program is free to apply backwards reasoning to it.
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unlockExistentialTarget
This move replaces a target of the form ∃x P (x) with a box that has nothing
above the line and the statement P (x) below the line. The box is labelled with
the variable x.
This move will never be applied to an existential universal conditional target,
since that will have been dealt with by unlockExistentialUniversalConditionalTar-
get. The main reason we have two separate moves here is that we prefer to bundle
the unlocking together with peeling and splitting when that is possible.
To see what unlockExistentialTarget allows the program to do, suppose that
we have a target of the form ∃x Q(x) ∧ R(x) and also a hypothesis of the form
∀u P (u) ⇒ Q(u). In this situation we would like to be able to do backwards rea-
soning inside the existential quantifier to reduce the target to ∃x P (x) ∧ R(x).
However, the program does not have a move for this. Instead, it unlocks the exis-
tential target, so that it has a box with the statement Q(x) ∧ R(x) below the
line. The tidying move splitConjunctiveTarget can now turn this new target into
two targets, and once it has done that, the applying move backwardsReasoning
can be used to replace the target Q(x) by P (x).
As another example of the use of unlocking, suppose that we wished to prove
that A ∩ B is non-empty and had the hypotheses x ∈ A and x ∈ B. The program
cannot see that x is a witness to the non-emptiness of A ∩B without doing some
processing. An obvious first step is to expand the target into the statement ∃u u ∈
A ∩ B. However, the program is not then allowed to do an elementary expansion
inside the quantifier. Instead, it unlocks u so that there is a new target u ∈ A∩B.
This can now be expanded and split into the two targets u ∈ A and u ∈ B,
which solveBullets can then match with the hypotheses.
This may seem a little circuitous, but it actually models quite closely how
humans think. A human might say, ‘I want to show that A ∩B is non-empty, so I
need to find some u that belongs to A∩B. In other words, I need u to be in A and
in B. Aha, I can take x.’ The program’s unlocking models the silent disappearance
of the existential quantifier before the second sentence of the above.
expandPreExistentialTarget
This does exactly what it says: it replaces a pre-existential target by its expansion.
convertDiamondToBullet
There are certain moves that the program will not do with a ‘diamonded’ vari-
able. In particular, it will not do any reasoning with a hypothesis that involves
such a variable: for that it needs a deeper level of suspension, roughly speaking
corresponding to the human move of ‘pretending that a variable has been chosen’
and then reasoning with it. Logically this is not an important difference, but it is a
useful one for us because it reflects a difference in the way human mathematicians
think and write. This helps the program to produce more convincing write-ups.
We do not need separate move types for reasoning that involves hypotheses
with bulleted variables: we just allow the reasoning moves above to take such
variables.
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An important technicality is that if we postpone the choice of a variable, we
must keep track of what other variables it is allowed to depend on. However, what
we actually do is note which variables it is not allowed to depend on. This is for
two reasons. First, it seems to reflect more accurately how human mathematicians
think about such variables, and secondly, it is more economical: there are typically
many fewer variables on which a bulleted variable is not allowed to depend than
variables on which it is allowed to depend.
2.4.5 Equality substitution
If we are told that two objects are equal, then we can eliminate all mention of
one object in favour of the other. The precise rules governing when and how
mathematicians tend to avail themselves of this opportunity are not obvious. The
rules below are best regarded as a temporary solution: they do not always result
in realistically human choices, and we intend to replace them by more satisfactory
rules in the near future.
rewriteVariableVariableEquality
If there is a hypothesis of the form x = y, then this move replaces all occurrences
of y by x and eliminates the hypothesis.
rewriteVariableTermEquality
If there is a hypothesis of the form v = t or t = v, where v is a variable and t is a
term, then this move replaces all occurrences of t by v.
2.5 Justification for the order of priority
From examining how humans solve simple problems in the theory of metric spaces,
it is not too hard to arrive at the above list of move types. But it is less clear what
principles should govern the architecture – that is, the way that the program
decides which move type to do in any given situation. One obvious method of
choosing an architecture is to work through a large number of problems and try to
observe what seems to be the natural approach. After a while, one can make a guess
at how the program should work, and if the guess results in strange behaviour for
some problems then one can refine it, hoping that the process of refinement will
stabilize quickly. An alternative method is to try to devise a theory that explains
which move is the best than in each situation: ideally, that will turn out to be the
move that humans are naturally drawn to. The second method is harder, but if it
works, then the advantage is that the rules are likely to be more robust: without
a proper theoretical backing, one cannot be as confident that they will not lead
to inappropriate behaviour when the program is presented with an unfamiliar
problem.
We have used a mixture of the two methods. We have good reasons for some of
the choices we have made, but other choices are justified by the fact that they seem
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to work (in the sense of leading to human-like behaviour). A broad overarching
principle that gives a theoretical backing to many of our choices is this: the program
prefers safe moves to dangerous moves. The picture we have here is one where at
any stage there is a choice of moves that can be made, and we have to make an
assessment of how likely any given choice is to form part of the argument one is
looking for. The greater this likelihood, the safer the move.
Because it seems hard to attach probabilities to statements in this way, we
have not tried to do so. However, since something like the above picture seems to
be what humans do, we bear the picture in mind when planning the program. In
particular, if a move is obviously safe, we will assign it a high priority.
A good example of a safe move is a tidying move. If, for example, we have
a conjunctive hypothesis, then there is nothing to lose by splitting it up into its
conjuncts, so that move we do automatically without any hesitation at all. By
contrast, expanding a definition is substantially less safe: sometimes it is possible
to reason in a high-level way without expanding, and since we do not allow ‘de-
expansion’ in this program (and in general allowing it would be highly problematic
because of the danger of an infinite loop), expanding a definition is closing off the
option of such high-level arguments. As an example, in the problem we discussed
earlier, the program does not expand the statements ‘(an) is Cauchy’, ‘(an) is a
sequence in A’ or ‘(an)→ a’. That allows it to do some high-level forwards library
reasoning that would no longer be possible if any one of those three statements
was expanded.
Thus, expansion has a fairly low priority. Having said that, some expansions,
such as elementary expansions or expansions of pre-existential hypotheses, are
considerably safer, so those ones have higher priority.
Somewhere in between are the other reasoning moves. Here it becomes more
complicated to apply the general principle (even as an informal guiding principle),
because the safety of a move type depends heavily on context. In particular, for-
wards reasoning is in general fairly unsafe – if you have a lot of information and
do not know which statements are relevant, then the probability that any given
deduction will form part of the eventual proof may be quite small – but is much
safer when it comes to routine problems, which tend not to suffer from the problem
of irrelevant information.
The psychology literature suggests that when it is safe, humans tend to prefer
forwards reasoning to backwards reasoning [42,34], though this appears to be a
question more of style than of problem-solving efficacy: we seem to prefer not to
keep track of a moving target if we do not have to. Since forwards reasoning tends
to be safe for the highly routine problems our program tackles, we have given
all forwards reasoning a higher priority than all backwards reasoning. This also
has the beneficial effect of making the program reluctant to switch direction –
too much switching from forwards to backwards or vice versa would again be bad
mathematical style.
This aspect of our program is, however, unstable, in that we know that in
order to develop the program we will have to change it. In fact, we even have an
example of a rather routine problem where our program performs badly for this
very reason. If it is asked to show that the intersection of two subgroups H and K
of a group G is itself a subgroup of G, then when it is trying to prove that H ∩K
is closed under multiplication, it expands, peels and splits the target, obtaining
two elements x and y of H ∩ K and a target of showing that xy ∈ H ∩ K. At
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that point, there is nothing to stop the program making ‘silly’ deductions such as
that x−1 ∈ H. There are various easy ways of dealing with this problem and we
shall implement these in future versions: for example, we could add restrictions on
creating new terms (a human would not think of deducing that x−1 ∈ H because
‘we are not interested in x−1’) or we could alter the priorities so that when there
are a number of possible forwards moves, so that it is no longer clear that they
are all relevant, the program switches to backwards reasoning.
One other feature of the ordering of reasoning moves is that we prefer pure
reasoning moves to library reasoning moves. That is because in general a hypothesis
is more likely to be relevant than a library statement, though if enough of the
premises of a library statement are present as hypotheses, that is a fairly strong
argument for its relevance.
At the bottom of the list of priorities is suspension. That is because humans
tend to regard it as a last resort. When mathematicians need to prove statements
of the form ∃x P (x), then by and large they prefer to simplify the problem until a
suitable candidate x0 for x becomes obvious and it remains to carry out the rela-
tively easy task of verifying that P (x0). Only when this straightforward approach
fails do we take the more drastic step of pretending that x has been chosen.
We will not say much more here about how we chose the priority order, but we
have two brief further points. First, although our reasons are not 100% precise, we
found that in practice they were adequate, in the sense that they suggested an order
before we started, and we found that we did not have to modify the order when
we tried further problems (though, as commented above, there are certain aspects
of the architecture that will need to be changed in future versions). Secondly,
when it comes to the finer detail of the ordering, there may not be that much
to choose between different move types. However, conflicts rarely arise between
different move types that are not distinguished by any of the above criteria, so in
practice these finer details have little if any effect on what the program actually
does.
2.6 Example: An intersection of two open sets is open
Now that we have discussed how the program works, let us look at another exam-
ple, which illustrates most of the move types and shows how the order or priority
works in practice. The problem to be solved is the following.
Problem 3 Let A and B be open subsets of a metric space X. Prove that A ∩ B
is open.
The initial problem state is as follows.
A is open
B is open
A ∩B is open
No reasoning moves are possible, so we end up having to expand. The highest
priority move we can do is expandPreUniversalTarget, which, after the tidying
move peelAndSplitUniversalConditionalTarget, has the following effect.
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A is open
B is open
x ∈ A ∩B
∃δ ∀y d(x, y) < δ ⇒ y ∈ A ∩B
It may look a little strange that we do not specify that δ > 0. The reason for
that is that we think of positivity as a ‘background condition’ rather than as a
‘substantive statement’. One reason that matters is connected with safety: if a
premise of a universal conditional hypothesis is satisfied by some variable, then
that is good evidence that the forwards reasoning one can do as a result is relevant
to the problem. Or rather, it is good evidence if the premise is a ‘substantive
statement’, but not if it is merely a background condition such as positivity. So
the distinction is a useful one. We think of background conditions as similar to,
but not the same as, type declarations. The program does, however, know that δ
is a positive real number: that fact is stored as background information when the
statement ‘A ∩B is open’ is expanded.
At this point, the reluctance of the program to suspend δ means that it does
as much forwards reasoning as it possibly can. It begins with elementaryExpan-
sionOfHypothesis, applied to the third hypothesis.
A is open
B is open
x ∈ A
x ∈ B
∃δ ∀y d(x, y) < δ ⇒ y ∈ A ∩B
This allows it apply two forwardsReasoning twice. After the first application, the
problem state is as follows.
A is open
B is open
x ∈ A
x ∈ B
∀u d(x, u) < η[x]⇒ u ∈ A
∃δ ∀y d(x, y) < δ ⇒ y ∈ A ∩B
Note that the last hypothesis is in a sense generated by a combination of submoves:
the first is forwardsReasoning (using the hypotheses x ∈ A and ‘A is open’) and the
second is a peeling (to get rid of ∃η at the beginning of the statement). However,
the latter is so automatic that it is not listed as one of our tidying moves: instead,
it is considered as part of any other move that potentially generates an existential
hypothesis.
It is important to keep track of the fact that η depends on x, which is what is
signified by η[x].
After this, deleteUnmatchable causes the program to delete the statements
x ∈ A and ‘A is open’. This is because both statements have been used, so they
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are vulnerable, and because it is no longer permissible to substitute x into ‘A is
open’. The resulting problem state is as follows.
B is open
x ∈ B
∀u d(x, u) < η[x]⇒ u ∈ A
∃δ ∀y d(x, y) < δ ⇒ y ∈ A ∩B
It then runs through a similar process for B (it does not yet have the capacity to
recognise that the problem is symmetric in A and B and say, ‘Similarly ...’). After
that process, it arrives at the following.
∀u d(x, u) < η[x]⇒ u ∈ A
∀v d(x, v) < θ[x]⇒ v ∈ B
∃δ ∀y d(x, y) < δ ⇒ y ∈ A ∩B
It has now reached the point where it must suspend δ. In the first instance, it uses
the move unlockExistentialUniversalConditionalTarget, which includes a peeling
and splitting. The result is as follows.
∀u d(x, u) < η[x]⇒ u ∈ A
∀v d(x, v) < θ[x]⇒ v ∈ B
d(x, y) < δ[y]
y ∈ A ∩ B
The notation δ•[y] signifies that δ is not allowed to depend on y.
The highest priority move the program can do now is elementaryExpansionOf-
Target, so it does that, and automatically splits the resulting conjunctive statement
(rather than using the move splitConjunctiveTarget).
∀u d(x, u) < η[x]⇒ u ∈ A
∀v d(x, v) < θ[x]⇒ v ∈ B
d(x, y) < δ[y]
y ∈ A
y ∈ B
This allows it to apply backwardsReasoning twice. After the two deductions
it reaches the following state. (It does them separately, so we are jumping a step
here.)
∀u d(x, u) < η[x]⇒ u ∈ A
∀v d(x, v) < θ[x]⇒ v ∈ B
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d(x, y) < δ[y]
d(x, y) < η[x]
d(x, y) < θ[x]
It then uses deleteUnmatchable to delete the two hypotheses it has just used.
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d(x, y) < δ[y]
d(x, y) < η[x]
d(x, y) < θ[x]
At this point, there is not much that the program can do, because it is not allowed
to reason with the diamonded variable δ. So the highest-priority move it can do
is convertDiamondToBullet. Also, since there are no hypotheses above the main
line, it may as well remove that line and the box.
d(x, y) < δ•[y]
d(x, y) < η[x]
d(x, y) < θ[x]
Now it applies backwardsLibraryReasoning. The result in the library is that if
a < b and b ≤ c, then a < c. Applying that with the hypothesis and the first target
results in the following problem state.
d(x, y) < δ•[y]
δ•[y] ≤ η[x]
d(x, y) < θ[x]
The deletion rules do not allow the program to delete the hypothesis we have just
used (and this is a good example of a situation where deletion would be a very
bad idea). However, it is aware that it cannot use the hypothesis with the new
target. (We shall not describe here the precise mechanism by which it gains this
awareness.) The program then uses backwardsLibraryReasoning again and this
time it does delete the hypothesis, on the grounds that the variable x that appears
in the hypothesis is dangling. After that, it has reached the following state.
δ•[y] ≤ η[x]
δ•[y] ≤ θ[x]
This is a ‘standard’ existence problem, so the solution is in a library of standard
solutions and the program declares the problem solved. It is here that the back-
ground information that δ, η and θ are positive is used, since the library result is
that the minimum of two positive real numbers a and b is a positive real number
that is less than or equal to both a and b.
That concludes the discussion of this example. For more examples of the pro-
gram’s output, as well as the precise output for this problem (which we have
very slightly simplified in one or two places to make the presentation clearer) see
http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/mg262/robotone.pdf .
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2.7 Writing up
In general, natural language generation is a complex process. It involves multiple
levels of planning, which draw on both domain knowledge and models of the in-
tended audience, and also a phase when the actual text is generated, which draws
on syntactic, morphological and lexical information. An overview of the process
may be found in [38]. Because of this complexity, building a fully fledged natural
language generation system is a major task. Furthermore, since mathematics con-
tains not just English words but also a large array of distinctive symbols used in
distinctive ways, it is not at all straightforward to use off-the-shelf systems.
Fortunately, mathematical language has properties that make the task con-
siderably simpler than it is for the English language in general. Foremost among
these is the fact that mathematical proofs almost always have a particularly sim-
ple rhetorical structure. To some degree this is because the domain of discourse
includes only timeless facts, which itself rules out a large proportion of the rhetor-
ical relations found in general text. But the main reason is that there is a strong
convention that further constrains the rhetorical structure of proofs. A proof pro-
ceeds by the presentation of a sequence of assertions, each of which follows from
the premises of the theorem being proved or from previous assertions. This struc-
ture is not accidental; it is a direct reflection of the fact that mathematicians
process proofs by reading and verifying one sentence at a time, and would not
expect the justification of a fact presented in one sentence to be deferred to a later
sentence. (We are talking here about proofs of the level of simplicity of the proofs
discussed in this paper. For more complicated arguments, facts may sometimes be
used before they have been proved, but in good mathematical writing this will be
carefully flagged up to make it as easy as possible for the reader to check that the
resulting argument is complete and not circular.)
This convention gives us an easy way to produce write-ups of our proofs. An
obvious strategy is to allow each move to generate some number of sentences (pos-
sibly zero), and to concatenate output from the different moves to produce the
final text. Note that this strategy is viable only because we are absolutely rigor-
ous about requiring our moves to reflect steps in human reasoning; in effect, the
strategy is mimicking a human who is carefully writing down down a proof while
coming up with it, which is quite straightforward for an experienced mathemati-
cian. (Again, this becomes less true if the proofs are more difficult.) As we shall
see below, this simple strategy produces surprisingly good results, though with a
weakness that needs to be dealt with by a postprocessing phase, which turns out
to be straightforward.
Because we have a fixed list of move types, implementing the strategy only
requires us to specify which sentences (if any) are produced for the moves of each
type. A very simple way to do this is to use template generation: each move type
is associated with a template, or ‘piece of text with holes’, and the holes are filled
in with concrete information about the facts and objects used in the actual move
performed. So, for example, forwards reasoning may be associated with a very
simple template ‘since < facts >, < deduced fact >’. Instantiating this template
would produce text like
Since A is open and x ∈ A, there exists η > 0 such that u ∈ A whenever
d(x, u) < η.
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Note that individual facts are expressed in idiomatic ways, rather being displayed
in a way that directly reflects the underlying predicate calculus; thus we have ‘A is
open’ and ‘η > 0’ rather than ‘open(A)’ and ‘greater than(η, 0)’. The same is true of
objects: we display ‘f ◦g’ rather than compose(f,g), and so on. Similarly quantifica-
tion is expressed idiomatically using words like ‘whenever’, where possible, rather
than using more stilted phrases like ‘for all’, which would more directly reflect the
underlying predicate calculus.
An example of the text produced by this method is as follows:
Let x be an element of A ∩ B. Since x ∈ A ∩ B, x ∈ A and x ∈ B. Since A
is open and x ∈ A, there exists η > 0 such that u ∈ A whenever d(x, u) < η.
Since B is open and x ∈ B, there exists θ > 0 such that v ∈ B whenever
d(x, v) < θ. We would like to find δ > 0 s. t. y ∈ A∩B whenever d(x, y) < δ.
But y ∈ A ∩ B if and only if y ∈ A and y ∈ B. We know that y ∈ A
whenever d(x, y) < η. We know that y ∈ B whenever d(x, y) < θ. Assume
now that d(x, y) < δ. Since d(x, y) < δ, d(x, y) < η if δ ≤ η. Since d(x, y) < δ,
d(x, y) < θ if δ ≤ θ. We may therefore take δ = min{η, θ}. We are done.
The main problem with this text is that it suffers a lack of coherence, in the
sense defined in [28]: the sentences are individually acceptable, but they do not
combine to form an idiomatic discourse. The principal reason for this is that the
text repeats information unnecessarily. For example, in
Since x ∈ A ∩ B, x ∈ A and x ∈ B. Since A is open and x ∈ A, there exists
η > 0 such that u ∈ A whenever d(x, u) < η.
the repetition of the underlined phrase is awkward. Because it is introduced by the
sentence immediately preceding the ‘since’ clause, it is awkward to have it spelt
out explicitly within that clause. Similarly, consider:
Since d(x, y) < δ, d(x, y) < η if δ ≤ η. Since d(x, y) < δ, d(x, y) < θ if δ ≤ θ.
Here, having two identical ‘since’ clauses in consecutive sentences is again awk-
ward: the repetition of material is unwieldy and unidiomatic.
We are of the opinion that [28] correctly diagnoses the underlying problem here.
Spelling out rhetorical relations, or aspects of rhetorical relations, that can easily
be inferred from the context violates Grice’s maxim of quantity [23]. Often the
solution is to substitute an appropriate and less explicit cue phrase. For example,
‘since A is open and x ∈ A, ...’ is better replaced by ‘therefore, since A is open,
...’. The cue phrase ‘therefore’ (which assume the relevant reason has just been
given) is less explicit than the cue phrase ‘since’ (which subordinates an explicitly
stated reason), so it avoids spelling out information that is clear from the context.
In other cases repetition can be avoided by combining sentences; for example, the
second example may be changed into
Since d(x, y) < δ, d(x, y) < η if δ ≤ η and d(x, y) < θ if δ ≤ θ.
The initial ‘sentence by sentence’ process described above is followed by a se-
ries of transformations that manipulate pairs of consecutive sentences in order
to resolve the issues just mentioned. (Needless to say, the transformations oper-
ate on a structural level rather than on the literal text.) Applying this series of
transformations to the example text above yields:
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Let x be an element of A ∩B. Then x ∈ A and x ∈ B. Therefore, since A is
open, there exists η > 0 such that u ∈ A whenever d(x, u) < η and since B
is open, there exists θ > 0 such that v ∈ B whenever d(x, v) < θ. We would
like to find δ > 0 s. t. y ∈ A ∩B whenever d(x, y) < δ. But y ∈ A ∩B if and
only if y ∈ A and y ∈ B. We know that y ∈ A whenever d(x, y) < η and that
y ∈ B whenever d(x, y) < θ. Assume now that d(x, y) < δ. Then d(x, y) < η
if δ ≤ η and d(x, y) < θ if δ ≤ θ. We may therefore take δ = min{η, θ} and
we are done.
One particular point worth emphasising is that the write-up process is deter-
ministic: it will always produce the same output text for any given proof. This is
for two reasons. First, if any non-determinism had been present we would have had
to evaluate many outputs for any given proof, which would have made iterative
improvement and fine-tuning of the write-ups considerably slower. Secondly, and
more importantly, if the process were nondeterministic, our claim that the pro-
gram produced human-like output would be suspect, in that we would have been
able to run the program several times and ‘cherry pick’ output. Unfortunately,
this determinism has an undesirable (but fully anticipated) side-effect. When one
compare several proofs produced by the program, the write-ups are much more
similar than those a human would produce. For example, most proofs produced by
the program end with the phrase ‘we are done’. In the long run, we will undoubt-
edly need to introduce nondeterministic stylistic variation, allowing the program
to vary the text generated for a particular step in just the way human would,
despite the difficulties that will cause.
Finally, it is worth noting that during the evaluation process described in the
next section, we collated a wealth of data on how humans write up proofs. We
anticipate using this data in combination with carefully chosen natural language
processing techniques to create substantially improved versions of the write-up
procedure.
3 Testing the write-ups
Once the program had generated the write-ups for several problems, we wanted
to test whether they could pass for write-ups written by a human mathematician.
In this section we describe an informal experiment that we carried out for this
purpose.
We began by asking two mathematicians, one an undergraduate and one a
PhD student, to write out proofs for five problems for which our program had
generated proof write-ups. We did not tell either of them why we were making
this unusual request, and we did not ask them to make their write-ups as good
as possible. One of the problems was to show that the inverse image of an open
set under a continuous function is open, and one of our volunteers decided to
prove the converse, so that he could use the topological definition of continuity
to prove another of the assertions – that a composition of continuous functions
is continuous. We had to ask him to rewrite the latter and give the epsilon-delta
proof, since we wanted the differences between the write-ups to be a matter of
style rather than substance.
We had another problem of this kind, which was that both our volunteers made
frequent use of open balls. For example, their expansion of ‘A∩B is open’ was ‘for
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every x ∈ A ∩ B there exists δ > 0 such that Bδ(x) ⊂ A ∩ B.’ This made some of
their arguments neater than the ones produced by our program. We contemplated
getting the program to redo the problems using open-balls expansions, but in the
end decided that it would be ‘cheating’ to make changes to its output in response
to the human write-ups we had solicited, so we left things as they were.
The program’s write-ups were not designed to be indistinguishable from human
write-ups: we merely wanted them to be acceptable as human write-ups. Therefore,
we left in certain features, such as ending every proof with the words, ‘we are done’,
that we could with a little trouble have changed. (See the brief discussion of non-
determinism at the end of the previous section.) For this reason, we did not want to
ask people to guess which write-ups were the by the program. Instead, we presented
all fifteen write-ups – two by humans and one by the program for each of the five
problems – on the second author’s blog, and asked readers of the blog to comment
on them in any way they liked. We also asked them to award points for clarity and
style. The orders of the write-ups were chosen randomly and independently. (The
precise mechanism was to decide on a one-to-one correspondence between the set
{1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6} to the set of permutations of the set {1, 2, 3}, then to find a website
that produced random dice rolls.) So that answers would be as independent as
possible, all comments and ratings were sent to the blog’s moderation queue and
published only after the experiment was finished and comments on the blog post
were closed.
The post can be found at http://gowers.wordpress.com/2013/03/25/an-experiment-concerning-mathematical-writing/
, together with all the comments and ratings, but the real point of the experiment
was to see whether anybody noticed that not all the write-ups were by humans.
Nobody expressed the slightest suspicion of this kind.
Having said that, we should also remark that many commenters were highly
critical of the program’s output. Three criticisms in particular stand out. First,
as we expected, the fact that the program did not use open balls was unpopu-
lar: many people commented that this made the write-ups unwieldy. Secondly,
several of the human write-ups stated the new target when the initial one had
been expanded, peeled and split. Several readers commented that they found this
helpful, and criticized our program for not doing it. And thirdly, commenters did
not like the way the program spelt out in detail how it thought of the right vari-
able to substitute into existential targets (such as choosing min{η, θ} for δ in the
intersection-of-open-sets problem.
It would be easy to modify the program so that none of these criticisms apply,
so they do not point to fundamentally non-human aspects of how it thinks. To
change the first, we would just have to use open-balls expansions of definitions
such as ‘A is open’ and ‘f is continuous’. To change the second, we could alter
the rule for what the write-up does when we expand, peel and split, so that it
states the new target (preceded by a phrase such as ‘We need to show that’). The
third criticism would be harder to deal with, but when we switch to having two
styles of write up – a ‘proof write-up’ and a ‘proof-discovery account’ – then for
the first style we will let the program work out the values of bulleted variables,
then simply declare those values when the variable is first mentioned after being
suspended. This will correspond to the human practice of writing something like
‘Let δ = min{η, θ}’ or ‘Consider the sequence (bn) defined by bn = an/(1 + an),’
which ‘magically’ does exactly what it needs to do later in the proof.
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Although our program’s output came in for quite a bit of criticism, so did the
write-ups by the undergraduate and PhD student – it seems that the readers were
harsh judges. However, for most of the problems, the human write-ups were found
preferable to the program’s.
After the success (as we considered it) of this experiment, we dared to try
a direct test. We published a new post, this time explaining that one proof was
by a program, one by an undergraduate and one by a PhD student, and inviting
readers to vote on which one they thought was by the program. For each problem,
the write-ups were numbered (a), (b) and (c). There were seven options for the
voting: one could choose between (a), (b) and (c), but also choose between ‘The
computer-generated output is definitely ∗’ and ‘I think the computer-generated
output is ∗ but am not certain’; the seventh option was ‘I have no idea which
write-up was computer generated.’ Again there was the opportunity to comment,
for those who wanted to explain the reasons for their choices.
We did not reveal the results of the voting so far, or anybody’s comments,
until the experiment was ended and the voting was closed. However, there was
a different kind of dependence between answers, which was that people had the
opportunity to look for clues that two different write-ups were from the same
source. Given that we had not tried to remove stylistic ‘tics’ from our program’s
write-ups, this put the program at a significant disadvantage. It was clear from
the comments that many people had noticed that for each problem exactly one
write-up ended with the words ‘we are done’.
Despite this, the program did reasonably well at fooling people that it was
human. The typical pattern was that roughly half the voters would correctly guess
which output was by the program, with slightly under half of that half saying
that the output was definitely by the program. The undergraduate would always
‘come second’, and there would always be a fair number of people who said that
they had no idea which output was written by the computer. There were surpris-
ingly many votes for ‘The computer-generated output is definitely ∗,’ when ∗ was
the wrong answer. The total number of votes was always at least 300, and for
the first problem listed (the intersection of open sets is open) it was over 1000.
One slight complication was that after a day or two the post was listed on the
front page of Hacker News. The result was that the number of votes doubled in
a couple of hours, and it may be that the profile of a typical voter changed. For-
tunately, we had noted down the voting numbers just before this happened, so
we presented those results as well as the final numbers. In the end, however, the
proportions did not change very much. The detailed numbers can be found here:
http://gowers.wordpress.com/2013/04/14/answers-results-of-polls-and-a-brief-description-of-the-program/
.
One thing this experiment could not tell us, except to a limited extent through
the comments, was whether the program was good at fooling mathematicians that
it was human. It could be that the more mathematically experienced readers found
the program’s output easy to distinguish, while the votes for the human write-ups
came from people who were not used to reading mathematical proofs. However,
we feel justified in concluding that the program’s output is not obviously written
by a computer program, and that was our objective.
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4 Future work
In the long term, we would like to enlarge significantly the set of problems that our
program, or some new version of it, is capable of solving. To do this, we will have to
enable the program to handle certain kinds of deductions that it currently handles
either not at all or only in a rather rudimentary way. In particular, an immediate
target is to give the program the means to deal with second-order quantification,
which would allow it to solve easy compactness problems, and also problems that
require the construction of ‘obvious’ sequences.
At a more basic level, the program does not currently solve problems that
involve proof by contraposition or contradiction. It is not hard to add moves that
allow it to cope with a few problems of this kind, but it is trickier to do so while
not letting it apply those moves in inappropriate contexts. More work is needed
to understand what triggers the ‘contradiction move’ in human mathematicians,
but we expect to be able to add this facility in the near future.
The program is also not as good as we would like at handling equality substi-
tutions. The situation here is similar: we can obviously add moves that do such
substitutions (and have done so in the current version of the program), but it is
more challenging to understand when humans make such substitutions. It is also
tricky to come up with a general understanding of how they choose which out of
two equal variables or complex terms to eliminate. At its most general, the prob-
lem of how to handle equality is well known to be hard, but our immediate aim
would be a program that can handle the easy cases of that problem competently
and in a human way.
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